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DEAD DOCKETING CRIMINAL CASES
IN GEORGIA
Published in The Georgia Defender, p. 4 (March 2003).  There is a caselaw update at the
end of the article.  Note: This article was co-authored by Karen S. Wilkes, Esq., Attorney
at Law, Rome, Georgia.
“Dead-docketing has been characterized as a procedural device by
which ‘the prosecution is postponed indefinitely but may be reinstated at
any time at the pleasure of the court.”’1 “‘Placing a case upon the dead
docket certainly constitutes neither a dismissal nor a termination of the
prosecution in the accused’s favor.  A case is still pending which can be
called for trial at the judge's pleasure, or upon which the accused can
make a demand for trial.”’2
The dead docketing 3 of criminal cases in Georgia was first statutorily
authorized by an 1883 statute which amended § 267(5) of the Georgia
Code of 1882 to require superior court clerks to keep, in addition to the
usual civil, criminal, and other dockets, “a docket of criminal cases, to
be known as the dead docket, to which cases shall be transferred, at the
discretion of the presiding judge, and which shall only be called at his
pleasure ...”4  The dead docketing provisions of this 1883 statute were
subsequently codified in the 1895 and 1910 Georgia Penal Codes 5 and
in the Georgia Code of 1933.6  With certain changes, these provisions
are now codified at OCGA § 15-6-61(a)(4)(B), which provides: “It is
the duty of the clerk of superior court ... [t]o keep in the clerk’s office
the following docket or books: [a] criminal docket ...  The criminal
docket shall contain ... entries of cases which are ordered dead docketed
at the discretion of the presiding judge and which shall be called only at
the judge’s pleasure.  When a case is thus dead docketed, all witnesses
who have been subpoenaed shall be released from further attendance
until resubpoenaed.”7  The current dead docketing statute thus differs
from previous codified dead docketing statutory provisions in that (1)
the clerk is no longer required to maintain a separate dead docket and
may enter dead docketed cases on the criminal docket; and (2) a case is
now dead docketed not by being “transferred” to the dead docket by the
judge, but by being “ordered dead docketed” by the judge.
Apart from OCGA § 15-6-61(a)(4)(B), the only other Georgia statutory
provisions making reference to dead docketing are OCGA §§ 17-6-31(c)
and 17-6-31(d)(1)(F), relating to the surrender of the principal and the
release from liability of a surety on a bail bond.9  OCGA § 17-6-31(c)
provides that “[t]he principal shall ... be considered surrendered by plea
of guilty or nolo contendere ... or if the principal is present in person
when the jury or judge ... finds the principal guilty or if the judge dead
dockets the case prior to entry of judgment and, upon such plea or
finding of guilty or dead docketing, the surety shall be released from
liability.”  Similarly, OCGA §17-6-31(d)(1)(F) provides that “the surety
shall be released from liability if, prior to entry of judgment, there is
...[a] dead docket ...”
Although there are scores of Georgia appellate cases which make
reference to the practice of dead docketing,  in only handful of these
cases (most of them in the Court of Appeals) is there any discussion of
the rules and procedures applicable to dead docketing.
Judging from the reported cases, it appears that usually the dead
docketing of a case does not occur until after there has been an
indictment or accusation.9  There are, however, some reported cases
where, before indictment or accusation, an arrest warrant was dead
docketed.10  The Georgia Court of Appeals, although refusing to decide
the lawfulness of the dead docketing of arrest warrants, has spoken of
“the possible inappropriateness of placing a warrant (rather than an
actual indictment) on the dead docket ...”11
A criminal case may be dead docketed by either a superior court or a
state court,12 at the request of either the prosecutor 13 or the defense
attorney.14  And, although there is no appellate court decision explicitly
holding that a prosecutor must give the defendant notice of a motion to
dead docket filed by the state, it would appear that the prosecutor is
statutorily required to do so.15
Because an order dead docketing a case after indictment or accusation is
not a dismissal of the charges, such an order is not appealable under
OCGA § 5-7-1(a), which permits prosecutors to appeal orders
dismissing indictments or accusations.16  For similar reasons, the dead
docketing of a case apparently tolls the running of the statute of
limitations.17
Nevertheless, “[t]he dead docket device may not be used to delay the
trial over the defendant's objection.”18  Thus, a defendant whose case has
been dead docketed is entitled to demand a speedy trial,19 and “the fact
that a case is placed upon the dead docket does not affect the
constitutional right to speedy trial.”20  Furthermore, it is an abuse of
discretion for a court to dead docket a case over the objection of the
defendant.22
Interestingly, much of the discussion about the dead docketing of
criminal cases is found in appellate decisions involving civil suits,
typically claims for malicious prosecution.  In order “[t]o recover in tort
for either malicious prosecution or malicious arrest, the [plaintiff] ha[s]
the burden of showing that the prior criminal proceeding, whatever its
extent, ha[s] terminated in [plaintiff’s] favor.”22  In this regard, the
appellate decisions make it abundantly clear that “[p]lacing a case on the
dead docket does not constitute either a dismissal or termination of the
prosecution in the accused’s favor.”23  It is therefore well-established
that for as long as his criminal case remains dead docketed, the
defendant therein is barred from recovering damages in an action for
malicious prosecution or malicious arrest arising out of that criminal
case.24
See the leading book of criminal forms in Georgia for three forms
relating to the dead docketing of criminal cases in Georgia: (1) a Motion
and Order to Place Case on Dead Docket,25 (2) an Order of Court
Placing Case on Dead Docket,26 and (3) a Motion and Order Removing
Case From Dead Docket.27
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Phillips v. State, 279 Ga. 704, 620 S.E.2d 367 (2005) (finding the
defendant received sufficient notice, for due process purposes, that his
case was being removed from trial court’s administrative dead docket
for retrial; because the issue was not raised below, it was not preserved
for appellate review)
Fischer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 180, 651 S.E.2d 432 (2007) (finding the
state negligent because of an unexplained delay where the case against a
defendant was placed on the “dead docket” because the investigator in
the case was on active duty in Iraq and not returning the case to the
active docket for four years even though the investigator was only away
for two years) 
Serrate v. State, 268 Ga. App. 276, 601 S.E.2d 766 (2004) (assuming,
without deciding, that the dead docketing of charges against a witness
stemmed from a “deal” with the State, the prosecutor was not required
to reveal this information about someone who did not end up testifying
at defendant’s trial)
Sapp v. State, 263 Ga. App. 122, 587 S.E.2d 267 (2003) (holding the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defendant from
cross-examining a witness regarding dead-docketed drug charges
against the witness that bore no relation to witness’s motivation for
testifying against defendant)
